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Securely erasing data is of key importance to anyone that is concernedwith the security of their
sensitiveinformation,whetheranindividualoranorganization.Simplydeletingthedatainquestion
or formatting the storage device is not enough to ensure that the data cannot be recovered.
Furthermore, with the uptake of Universal Serial Bus drives (USBs) flash memory based storage
deviceshavereplacedpreviousportablesecondarystoragemedia.Therefore,itisofamajorconcern
whetherthesetoolsandproductsdevelopedforsecurelyerasingdatasecondarystorageHardDisk
Drives (HDDs)wouldbeasefficientwhen targeting theUSB flashmemorystoragedevices.Witha
wide rangeofopen sourceandcommercialproductsavailableon themarket,all claiming,among
otherthings, tobeabletosecurelydeleteyourdata, it isquiteadifficult taskfortheconsumerto
pickthemostefficientproduct.Thispaperthereforediscussestheresultsofexperimentsconducted








Portable digital data has shown an exponential growth with the evolution and advancement of
electronic devices (Sudan, Badam, & Nellans, 2012). With increased mobility, individuals and
corporate endusers need to travel light and be fully connected. As a result, there has been an
increaseinthenumberofportabledevicesthatarebeingusedsuchaslaptops,notebooks,Universal
Serial Bus (USB) flash memory storage devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and advanced
mobilephoneswhichhavegainedenormouspopularityandareusedbymillionsofpeopleacross
theworld (Jones, Valli & Dabibi, 2009). Therefore, it is of no surprise that the abovementioned
devices are now increasingly players in the evidentiary process (Choo, Smith &McCusker, 2009;
Goodin,2012).Withindividualsandemployeesusingmobiledevicesandtravellingwithdatawhilst
takingworkhome,organizationsarecontinuouslybeingexposedtounprotecteddataonUSBflash




because of their size, huge storage capabilities and theirweight, allmaking themhighly portable
(Hu, 2004).  However, with convenience and mobility come risks. These devices, along with the






For those who seek to completely and securely erase data on their USB flash memory storage
devices,ormorecommonlyexpressedas“wiping”thedatafromtheirdevices,thereisawiderange




other is yet to be proven. The aim of this research is to test and evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of both open source (Freely Available Ones  FAOs) and commercial (Commercially
BasedOnes–CBO)productstoverifywhichonewouldbeabetteroptionfromaconsumer’spoint
ofview.Itshouldalsobenotedthattheresearchisaimedattargetingtoolsandproductsthatclaim
to work on USB flash memory storage devices and ascertaining whether spending money on a











1 RemoDriveWipe 336404 9
2 CyberScrubSecurityMediaWipe 1.0 1
3 Active@Eraser 4.1 6
4 O&OSafeErase 6.0.460 6









1 DiskWipe 1.7 7
2 Eraser 6.0.10 13
3 HardWipe 3.1.0 6
4 CCleaner 4.06.4324 4




In a study conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2012) it was revealed that more than half of
employeesreportedcopyingsensitiveinformationtoaremovableUSBflashmemorystoragedevice,
even though 87% of those companies had policies prohibiting this practice. The same
aforementionedemployeesconfessedthattogetridoftheexistingdataontheUSBflashmemory
storage device they would just select the “DELETE” button to delete either the current data or
previouslyrecordeddata(36%).Theremaining8%believedthatwhenusingthe“FORMAT”function
on the removableUSB flashmemory storagedevice, all thedata on thedevicewould havebeen
deleted hence no traces would be left (ENISA, 2009). This factor underlines that employee
knowledgeonsecuredataerasureisverylimited,ifnotnonexistent.

Another study carried out by SanDisk (2010), revealed that employees are trained on policies
revolvingarounddataerasureand theuseofUSB flashmemory storagedevices: eitheronceper
year (33%);more than once per year (24%); only oncewhen they join the company (22%); on
demand (17 %); and never (3 %). It is therefore crucial to underscore that education and the
awareness of the risks of not securely and permanently wiping your data while using USB flash




















approximately 5,000Canadians.ManyCanadians,whohad their data storedon thisUSB key,
were alerted to review their financial information. However, there has been no evidence to
suggestthatanyfraudulentactivityhastakenplacesincetheUSBkeywaslost.(PrinceGeorge
Citizen,2013).
 AthumbdrivewasstolenfromaNurse'scar inDenveronOctober18,whichhad information





names, addresses, genders, birth dates and whether a person voted in the last election for
residents.
 According to the Washington Post (2010), defence official discloses cyberattack “Now it is
official: The most significant breach of U.S. military computers was caused by a flash drive
insertedintoaU.S.militarylaptoponapostintheMiddleEastin2008”.Inanarticlepublished
discussing the Pentagon's cyber strategy, Deputy Defence Secretary William J. Lynn III says
malicious code placed on the drive by a foreign intelligence agency uploaded itself onto a
networkrunbytheU.S.military'sCentralCommand.
 AreportontheCBCNEWSinCanada(2010)reportedthattheUniversityHealthNetwork(UHN)





petrol bomb attacks, blast control training and the useof batons and shields togetherwith a
comprehensivelistofofficers'names,ranksandtheirdivisions(Raywood,2010).

With theoccurrenceof such incidents jeopardising individuals, organisationsandgovernmentsno




To support a reasonable and scientific approach to the research, ten USB flashmemory storage











prepare a forensically sound mirror drive before cloning, to ensure that no data is left from a
previousexamination.

According to the US Department of Defense (2007), the standard DSS Clearing and Sanitization





However to sanitize the removable USB flashmemory storage devices according tomethod “h”,
overwritealladdressablelocationswithacharacter,itscomplement,thenarandomcharacter,and





























































The research methodology leveraged the tools and techniques used in a previous similar study
undertaken on hard disk drives (HDDs) (Valli & Patak, 2005). As a result, the imaging of each
removableUSBflashmemorystoragedevicewasundertakenbyusingthefreelyavailablesoftware
AccessData Forensic Toolkit Imager 3.1.3 (FTK Imager, 2013). Recovery and analysis was






toevaluate towhat extentwas the information recovereduseful.Variousonline andprintmedia
publicity has been given to individuals and organisations (Lee, 2011;Moscaritolo, 2010) that the
disposalofstoragemediainaninsecuremannercanresultinleakedprivateandconfidentialdata.
Despitethesewarnings,itwasassumedthatenduserswouldcontinuetobenegligentinsecurely,





 Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) Imager Version 3.1.3  Free software for creating images of the
removableUSBflashmemorystoragedevicesaftererasure.
 Windows7Professional,32bitworkstationimageForinstallingandrunningthedataerasure


































For the purpose of this research, a known data setwas used so that itwould ease the recovery












1 avi .avi 826
2 Blackbuck .bmp 769
3 Bng_strip .png 18
4 Create .sql 1
5 gif .gif 1025
6 ipeg .ipg 5381
7 jpg .jpg 77
8 Mp4 .mp4 500
9 NewMicrosoftExcelWorksheet .xlsx 10
10 NewTextDocument .txt 1
11 Presentation1 .ppt 232
12 refguide .pdf 864
13 Robin_Thicke_Feat._T.I._and_Pharrell_Blurred_Lines_(Itunes)_[32] .mp3 1314
14 Typethecompanyname .docx 23
15 xls .xls 24




















The Time Efficiency (TE) and Total Erasure Efficiency (TEE) of the data erasure product are then













HardDriveEraser2.0 4 4/4 100% 1
DiskWipe 7 7/7 100% 1
CCleaner 4 4/4 100% 1
EastTecEraser 13 13/13 100% 1
Eraser 13 8/13 61% 2
O&OSafeErase6 6 2/6 33% 3
HardWipe 6 1/6 16% 4
RemoDriveWipe 9 1/9 11% 5
CyberScrub 1 0/1 0% 6





































ZeroWrite 0:21 0:03 1:04 0:01 0:01 0:02 0:04 N/A 0:01 0:09
Random
Data 0:21 0:04 N/A N/A 0:01 0:03 0:04 N/A 0:01 0:11
DoD3 0:12 0:08 1:21 0:02 0:02 0:05 0:15 0:03 0:02 0:12
DoD7 0:34 0:16 N/A 0:07 N/A 0:10 0:05 N/A 0:10 N/A

















In figure4above, thegraphshows thatoutof the fiveCBOsunderanalysis, therewere twodata
erasure products that had a zero percent in TEE, namely Active@ Eraser and Cyber ScrubMedia
Wiperwhichmeans,thatthesetwodataerasureproductswereclassifiedas“UNTRUE”.Therefore
thetwoaforementioneddataerasureproductsdidnotperformaccordingtowhattheyclaimed.In
otherwords fragments and partial datasetswere recovered even after going through thewiping



















In the FAOs category, three out of the five data erasure products hit the 100% TEE. One very
interestingobservationwasthatnoneoftheFAOshitthezeropercentmark incomparisontothe
CBOs.ThisnowleadsustobelievethattheFAOsaremorelikelytoperformabetterjobatsecurely,

























gure 3 shows how the commercial products compare in regard to their time efficiency. Notably,


























and analysing all the findings that some of the CBOs category performed better in a timelier,
efficientmannercomparedonaveragetotheFAOs.However,theFAOscategoryrevealedthatthe
products did securely, efficiently and permanently erase remnant data from removableUSB flash


























































than theFAOs, it is clear thatbasedon theoutcomesand findings that theFAOscategory in this
particularresearch–i.e.basedontheproductsandtoolsusedprevailsasthebetterproduct.This
researchalsohasthepotentialtohelpthevariousvendors,especiallythoseintheCBOscategory,to
reevaluate their data erasure products in regards to the removable USB flash memory storage
devicesandhenceaddresstheirweaknesses.Futureexperimentswouldencompasstestingthedata
erasure products on other media such as SD Cards or Solid State Drives SSDs to observe how













recovery from all but themost sophisticated forensic techniques. However, it was found that in
some cases, data remains in plain view and is easily recoverable. These findings provide some
credencetotheargumentthatnotalldataerasureproductsarecreatedequal.

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